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Abstract 
 
During large sporting events criminal behaviour may be affected via three main 
channels: (i) fan concentration, (ii) self incapacitation, and (iii) police displacement. 
In this paper I exploit information on football (soccer) matches for nine London teams 
linked to detailed recorded crime data at the area level to empirically estimate these 
different effects. My findings show that only property crime significantly increases in 
the communities hosting football matches but that they experience no changes in 
violent offences. These results are robust to controlling for a large number of game 
type and outcome characteristics. There is no evidence of temporal displacement of 
criminal activity. Our conceptual model suggests that the away game attendance 
effect on crime is due to voluntary incapacitation of potential offenders. I argue that 
the police displacement effect of hosting a match increases property crime by 7 
percentage point for every extra 10,000 supporters. 
  
                                                 
∗ I would like to thank Arnaud Chevalier, Thomas Dohmen, Stephen Machin, Jonathan Wadsworth and 
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Conference for useful discussion and comments. I am extremely grateful to Mark Baber from the 
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“If I were involved in criminality of a more sophisticated kind… would I not 
work on the assumption that the police will be fully occupied in a particular city 
- it will not be difficult to find out when these premiership games are being 
played - and I could go about my unlawful business?” 
Question by Mr David Winnick MP to the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee “The Cost of Policing Football”, 16 June 2009.  
  
 
Introduction 
The impact on local crime rates of hosting large sporting events is complex. It is 
not limited to the documented increases in violence resulting from (i) the 
concentration of hostile fans. One must also consider the impact on criminal 
behaviour of:  (ii) the displacement of police personnel sent to monitor the event and 
(iii) the voluntary incapacitation of a substantial number of individuals who are 
assisting it. Still, most research on this issue has focused on documenting and 
studying aggressive fan behaviour. This literature has attempted to explain the reasons 
for the recurring problem of crowd violence during sporting events (see review by 
Young 2002) with special attention to the phenomenon of hooliganism associated 
with European football1 (Dunning et al 1988) which reached its peak in the 1980s. 
One aim of this research will be to investigate if a similar relationship can be observed 
during football matches because of the geographical concentration of rival fans. But 
we are also interested in other possible indirect impacts that hosting sporting events 
could have on local crime and especially property and other nonviolent offences. The 
first effect to consider stems from the possible displacement of law enforcement 
personnel sent to police a game which could leave other areas under-protected. 
Another effect is that of some potential offender being voluntarily incapacitated 
among the large numbers of individuals busy assisting a game.  
In this paper we estimate the overall impact of hosting a sporting event on local 
crime taking into account all these possible impacts on offending behaviour. Because 
the relationship described is relatively complex, we first develop a conceptual 
framework to disentangle the different effects through which match attendance and 
police displacement affect crime. While it is difficult to exactly estimate the 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper we will refer to football as what is known in the US as soccer. We will specify 
‘American’ when we mention the other form of the game.  
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respective impact of concentration, displacement, and self-incapacitation on crime, we 
can get an idea of their relative influence by making some simple assumptions on 
their likely impact on various types of offences for home and away matches. This 
strategy of differentiating between property and violent crimes is inspired by the work 
of Jacobs and Legren (2003) on the impact of school attendance on juvenile 
offending. They found that concentration of youths when school is in session 
increased violent crime but also led to drops in property crime they attribute to a self 
incapacitation effect. With sporting events we can assume that offending behaviour 
could be affected in a relatively similar manner. We can also consider the difference 
in impact of the local team playing at home and away since police displacement 
should only occur when the event is hosted in the area. Finally we can treat each 
match according to the size of the fan population they are likely to attract. When the 
game is being played away this should only have an impact on the potential numbers 
of offenders incapacitated during the game. As Dahl and Della Vigna (2009) point out 
in their study of the impact of violent movies on violent crime, the size of an audience 
should matter more for criminal behaviour if there is self selection into attendance. 
We argue that football fans are a non-random sample of the population with 
demographic characteristics making them more prone to be potential offenders. 
Combining all these assumptions we can  identify each of the three channels through 
which sporting events could impact on crime separately. 
We gathered information on the home and away matches of the nine major 
London football teams with stadiums located in seven different boroughs of the city. 
We have matched this data to hourly recorded crime from the Metropolitan Crime 
Statistics System (MCSS) covering 31 London boroughs2 that is available from 
October 1994 to March 1997. We divide each day into four six hour windows starting 
at 6 A.M.. Almost all matches start either at 3 P.M. or 8 P.M. and we label the period 
during a game accordingly as the second or third six hour window of the day. To 
identify a match effect on local criminal activity we can exploit the variation in 
location and timing of both home and away games. Since we have extensive 
information on each game, we will focus our attention on the impact of the large 
variations in attendance for our identification, controlling for weather conditions and 
                                                 
2 There are 32 boroughs or Local Authorities in London but one of them, Sutton, did not properly 
record crime on the central system during this period. Fortunately for us, it does not host any important 
football team and also is on the periphery of the city.  
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whether the game is played on a holiday. We also include a whole set of controls to 
net out the possible influence of other matches taking place at the same time as well 
as the distance of each borough to the stadium hosting a home game and the distance 
of each away match. We check how the results are affected by controlling for the type 
of game being played and the outcome of each match as these factors could influence 
the three effects we seek to identify differently. Finally we consider the issue of 
possible temporal displacement of criminal activity before and after games. This is 
important for two reason: first crime rates have been shown  to be serially correlated 
(Jacobs et al 2007) and decond, post event criminal activity of an audience could 
change for psychological reasons (Dahl and Della Vigna 2009). In all the models we 
estimate we include borough, hour window, day of the week, month, and football 
season fixed effects to account for unobserved time- and location-specific factors that 
may be correlated with matches and crime. 
  We find that the level of property crime increases by roughly 4 percent and falls 
by about 3 percent for every extra 10,000 supporters attending respectively a home 
and an away game.  According to our conceptual framework we conclude that 
displacement of police is the  factor that contributes most to the rise in property crime, 
likely because opportunistic offenders in the under protected areas of the borough take 
advantage of the smaller detection probability. We also conclude that voluntary 
incapacitation can explain the drop in criminal activity  observed when attendance to 
away matches increases. We find no measureable impact on violent crime in the local 
community except during a derby match (i.e. when London teams play each other). 
This suggests some effect of concentration during those matches which are reputedly 
the ones with the highest levels of animosity between rival fans. As for displacement 
of crime, there are some signs that violence increases in the period after home games 
with attendance. This is again consistent with some level of hooligan behaviour 
between opposing fans after games. We then consider the difference in coefficients 
between home and away attendance on crime for up to 12 time periods before and 
after a match. We see then that only differences in property crime with changes in 
attendance are statistically significant. This leads us to downplay the importance of 
temporal displacement resulting from sporting events.  
Our overall conclusion is therefore that, assuming that voluntary incapacitation 
has a relatively similar impact during home and away games, the displacement of 
police forces during football matches increases property crime by almost 7 percentage 
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points for every extra 10,000 fans attending a game. This is in line with a growing 
body of evidence that police presence has an important effect on reducing crime. It 
also raises important issues of the negative impact of policing of private sporting 
events at the cost of the local communities wellbeing. Also it demonstrates the 
importance of considering all the direct and indirect channels which may influence 
crime when investigating such issues.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I presents a 
conceptual framework for understanding and identifying the match-crime relationship. 
Section II describes the data used in this analysis. Section III presents the results and 
Section IV concludes.  
 
I. Understanding and Identifying the Match-Crime Relationship 
 
A - Conceptual Framework 
There are three channels through which we expect sporting events to influence crime 
in the local community: concentration, displacement, and incapacitation.  We describe 
in detail each of their likely respective impact below. 
 
Concentration 
Concentration is perhaps the channel that first comes to mind, as is evident by the 
enormous amount of anecdotal evidence. The geographical concentration of fans from 
teams with long standing histories of rivalry is likely to increase the number of 
volatile interaction among them. In its most extreme form this can lead to the levels of 
hooligan violence observed during European football matches in the 1980’s3. More 
generally we expect that concentration could, on average, increase the incidence of 
violent offences in the communities which are hosting a home match. When games 
are played away, it is on the contrary unlikely that concentration will affect crime in 
the areas where the teams come from.  
Note here that we are assuming no impact on property crime levels of 
concentration. This is perhaps a strong assumption since it is possible that matches 
                                                 
3 During the 1985 European Cup Final between Juventus and Liverpool, 39 fans were killed and a 
further 600 were injured after the attack by supporters of the English club. British teams were then 
banned for five years to participate in any European competitions as punishment for the violent 
behaviour of their fans.  This did not prevent the worst stadium related disaster in England four years 
later, the Hillsborough Disaster, where 96 football fans died as a result of unruly crowd behaviour and 
poor policing. 
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facilitate the coordination of crime among fans including property offences. This 
could reveal itself in the form of higher levels of thefts after matches which were 
planned during the event. We do not observe such an effect and argue as Jacob and 
Legren (2003) in their study of school attendance and juvenile crime that 
concentration is likely to only have an impact on violent offences. In the context of 
large sporting events the potential numbers of violent interactions will increase with 
attendance levels. It could also depend on a game’s outcome (e.g. upset loss) which 
may affect the emotional state of fans to a point of modifying their gain-loss utility 
perception of participation in violence4. This may also be influenced by the level of 
rivalry between the teams which may further increase the potential for unruly crowd 
behaviour.  
We can argue that these parameters will be taken into account when local 
authorities decide the level of police personnel to deploy around  stadiums during 
each home game. This leads us to consider the possible impact of police displacement 
during sporting events on local crime activity. 
 
Displacement 
There is a growing literature looking at the police-crime relationship using terrorism 
related events since they sometimes induce a surge in police presence in particular 
locations (Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004 and Draca et al 2008). Exploiting the 
resulting unexpected displacement in law enforcement personnel is an interesting 
strategy to measure the impact the police may have on criminal activity. In the case of 
football matches in England there is also a large increase in police presence around a 
particular location: the stadiums. However this increase is not the result of unexpected 
consequences such as a terrorist attack. Consequently one could assume that with 
proper planning the effect of concentrating police at the stadium should be minimal, 
and displacement in the area could be avoided.  
                                                 
4 Emotions on decision making has been extensively studied by psychologists and behavioural 
economists (e.g. Lowenstein 2000). Recent research by Card and Dahl (2009) investigates the impact 
of negative emotional cues from unexpected losses of a local American football team on domestic 
violence rates. They find that upset losses for the home team lead to an 8 percent increase in reports of 
male-on-female in the home to the police just after the match. We do not investigate domestic violence 
in this paper because of data limitations but believe the same emotional cue mechanism may explain 
possible violent encounters at sporting events. Indeed, in a recent paper Rees and Schnepel (2009) 
observed that local crime rates for a number of violence related offences were affected by upset losses 
(and wins) when the area is hosting an American college football game.  
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However,  there is evidence  of a substantial amount of displacement occurring 
during matches. A report commissioned by the Metropolitan Police Authority on the 
impact of policing football games in London concluded that: “On an average 
Saturday, 500 officers are lost to their communities policing football matches 
throughout the MPA…Football costs the MPA £7.4M in police staffing alone” (MPA 
2003). These estimated 500 officers represent about 7 percent of the police manpower 
working in London on an average Saturday being deployed to monitor football 
matches instead of their regular duties5. This is a relatively high level of a regular 
displacement considering that it compares to for example the exceptional 34 percent 
local surge in police after the terrorist attacks of July 7 2005 in London (Draca et al 
2008)6.  
The MPA report also gives evidence on the large difference in the cost in terms 
of number of officers deployed at matches depending on the police risk classification 
of the game played. These costs almost double when the risk increases with the 
expected level of attendance at a game and the type of match which will be played.  
We exploit the variation in crowd attendance at football matches as a proxy for the 
level of police displacement and the type of game played, especially competitions, 
since policing strategy cannot in theory be planned as accurately for those matches 
since they only occur with a win from the local team. Note that displacement only 
occurs during home games and that it could equally affect violent and property crime 
in the under protected areas of the boroughs hosting those matches  
   
 
Incapacitation 
Incapacitation is the general term used to express that individuals who are 
incarcerated or otherwise monitored cannot commit crimes in the community. More 
recently this definition has expended to other activities in which potential offenders 
engage more or less voluntarily keeping them from committing crimes. The impact of 
                                                 
5 On an average Saturday all the police force in London work about 60,000 hours. This number divided 
by an 8 hour working day gives 7,500 officers (500/7,500 = 0.066)   
6 The fact that the police displacement caused is not due to an unexpected shock may be actually be 
beneficial to our analysis. This is because there is reason to believe that severe unforeseen events such 
as terror attacks which trigger changes in policing, may at the same time change the economic 
behaviour of individuals sharply in the short run (Bloom 2009), and likely also affect criminal 
behaviour. Regular displacement from sporting events should not suffer from this problem of correlated 
shock for our identification strategy. However one important effect which may change the behaviour of 
potential criminals is if they are busy assisting a match and consequently voluntarily incapacitated. 
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self-incapacitation on offending behaviour has been investigated in the context of 
school attendance and juvenile crime (Jacob and Lefgren 2003) and violent movie 
frequentation and  the incidence of violence (Dahl and Della Vigna 2009). In both 
cases the authors point out that these activities are undertaken by sub-samples of the 
population which have relatively high propensities of committing crime: the young 
and the potentially violent. Can we argue that the same selection is occurring for 
individuals choosing to attend football matches? 
 There is little information on who football fans who attend games are apart for 
some basic demographic characteristics. Still, one of the most widely documented 
factor explaining the probability of individuals’ criminal behaviour is linked to their 
gender and age profile (Hirshi and Gottferdson 1983, Hansen 2003). In the UK arrest 
data shows that 85 percent of arrested offenders are male and 80 percent are under 30 
years old. Surveys of English football supporters (FA Premier League Fan Survey 
1994-1997) show that over 50 percent of them are under 30 years of age and  nine out 
of ten are male. This is evidence of the strong demographic similarities between the 
football fan and the crime committing population. This does not imply that supporters 
are systematically potential offenders It suggests that as the attendance and 
importance of a game grows it is increasingly possible that it will incapacitate certain 
individuals which would have otherwise been involved in criminal activity. 
We assume here that voluntary incapacitation will similarly impact on property 
and violent crime in a similar way. More importantly we argue that  incapacitation 
influences criminal behaviour during both home and away games. This is supported 
by the afore mentioned fan surveys which show that fans attempt to travel to as many 
away games as possible, or will at least watch the television broadcast of the match. 
One other important characteristic of football fans is that two thirds of them report 
that they are born locally (within 20 miles of where team plays). This is important:  if 
we want to attribute changes in borough crime rates to incapacitation of potential local 
criminals, matches must  attract  fans who also reside in the area. To  assess the  
incapacitation impact of a match we exploit the variation in attendance levels to each 
game, which captures the variation in the degree of incapacitation.  
 
B – Identification Strategy 
We summarise the impact of the three potential channels - concentration, 
displacement, and incapacitation - through which sporting events  potentially affect 
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crime in Figure 1.  The direction of each of the effects sporting events may have on 
crime is represented by type of crime and home or away game. This depiction of the 
conceptual framework makes it  clear that a decrease in property or violent crime 
during an away game can be attributed to some level of incapacitation. Signs of 
increased property criminal activity during a home game would be interpreted as the 
effect of police displacement being stronger than the incapacitation effect. An 
estimate of the net displacement effect on property crime could be consequently 
generated by comparing the impact of home and away games on such offences. 
Finally, a measure of the impact of concentration could be obtained by comparing the 
change in property and violent crimes during home games.  
We return later to the interpretation of separate estimates for each of the effects 
we are interested in. First we present the simple model we will use to identify the 
match-crime relationship: 
           
   
where crime is a measure of criminal activity (property or violent) at time t in area a. 
α is an area level fixed effect. Home and Away are binary variable which take the 
value one or zero if the team from area a is respectively playing a match at home or 
away.  HomeAtt and AwayAtt represent the corresponding attendance levels to each of 
these matches. The δ  coefficients will therefore capture the home and away match 
effects in the boroughs concerned. Our real interest lies in the identification of the β 
coefficients which will be estimates of the direction of the variations in attendance on 
the direction of the effects summarised in Figure 1.  
To improve our estimation of the match-crime relationship we must consider a 
number of other factors which may influence game attendance and offending 
simultaneously. The first obvious candidate is the weather which has been proven to 
change crime patterns (Jacobs et al 2007) and is also likely to have an impact on 
match attendance. We therefore include weather controls in our model measuring 
daily temperatures and rain falls. The day and the hour at which a match is played 
could also be important. Crime is not evenly distributed during the day and across 
days of the week. The fans attending afternoon or evening games may also be 
different and this may change from one season to the next depending on the successes 
of each team. To attempt and capture all these concerns we include borough*period of 
the day*day of the week*month*season fixed effects in our models. Finally our first 
atuatAwayAttatAwayatHomeAttatHomeaatCrime +++++= 2211 βδβδα
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model should include a holiday indicator since such days may also lead to changes in 
attendance and crime patterns simultaneously. 
There are two other factors which could influence our estimation strategy in light 
of the conceptual framework we have developed. First it is important to note that there 
can be more than one home or away game being played by each of the teams we 
consider. This could have an impact on the levels of police displacement and 
voluntary incapacitation that go beyond just the match and attendances we measure 
for a single borough. We therefore control in our model for the number of other home 
or away games taking place in other areas and the level of attendance these matches 
attract. Second we have to consider that the impact a match in one area will have on 
other areas will partly depend on the distance between the two entities. We 
consequently include an indicator of the distance of each borough to the one where 
the local team is playing a home or an away game to capture this effect. Related to 
this we may be concerned that the attendance to away games will differ depending on 
the distance of the host team. We therefore also include distance in kilometres to the 
away game in the models we will estimate for various crime categories. 
A final important set of factors which could influence the match-crime 
relationship will depend on the type of match and outcome of the game that is being 
played. Rees and Schnepel (2008) and Card and Dahl (2009) found for example that 
when the local team suffers an ‘upset’ loss it further increases the incidence of 
respectively violent offences and domestic violence. We will therefore control for the 
game having been lost when it was expected to be won to test this hypothesis in our 
context. We also include controls for the goal difference, number of yellow and red 
cards received during the game, and the match being a derby (one London team 
against another). We argue that these characteristics of a football match could incite 
changes in fan behaviour not captured by the size of the crowd attending a game. 
Theoretically they should mostly impact on violent crime if supporters are 
psychologically affected by the success or defeat of their team or the level of conflict 
between players they have witnessed during the game. Rivalries are notoriously the 
highest between teams from the same city and this heightened potential for volatile 
interactions will be captured by our derby dummy. A last element of interest for our 
identification is to see if there is a differential impact of matches on crime if the 
games were scheduled on short notice. This would be reflected by the impact on local 
crime of football matches  changing as teams move further up a knockout competition 
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. We test this assumption by including at which round of a competition the game 
being played belongs.  
 
C - Temporal Displacement 
The extensive modelling strategy we describe should enable us to reliably estimate the 
impact of football matches on local area crime. Still we must concern ourselves with 
the possibility that any impact we may find is simply the result of the temporal 
displacement of criminal activity. This is why we should carefully consider how crime 
incidence changes before and after a game takes place.  This is especially important in 
the context of analysing the behaviour of football fans as rival supporters may prefer 
to engage in violent behaviour before or after matches. There are two reasons for this. 
First they may choose to focus on the sport during the match or in other words prefer 
voluntary incapacitation over engaging in violent interaction at that time. Also the 
risks of detection are the highest in the vicinity of stadiums during the match because 
of the large number of police forces deployed there. Rival fans may therefore decide 
to settle scores before or after a game for these two reasons. This would impact on the 
measured levels of violent crime observed before or after a home game. We will 
therefore estimate lagged and forward models which include all the controls 
mentioned above. Controlling for type and outcome of matches is important since the 
psychological factors we discussed above could influence criminal behaviour in the 
short run.  
We will also investigate how property crime is affected in the time periods 
surrounding matches. Let us make the assumption that individuals choose to make an 
optimal number of crime, for example one, each day for financial reasons. If this 
offender is voluntarily incapacitated during a match because he is following it, he/she 
will decide to commit the property crime at another moment during that day. On the 
other hand if this criminal is an opportunistic one, he/she will choose to commit the 
property offence while police are displaced during a game. The first example would 
increase property crime before or after matches while the second one would reduce 
this type of criminal activity outside the game period. The main argument here is that 
the aggregate number of property crimes in a borough would then not change during 
the entire day. The game effect would only distort the time at which they occur. 
Another concern is the possibility of offenders coordinating future crimes while they 
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are together at matches. In this case the quantity of offences would increase in the 
periods following games more than by the normal daily aggregated level of crime. 
To investigate this possibility we also extend our period of investigation to plus 
and minus twelve six hour periods before and after games. This corresponds to the 
three days around matches which is logical time choice if we assume optimal criminal 
decisions being made on a weekly basis. We will present the difference between home 
and away attendance coefficients (β1 – β2) for all 25 periods to consider how matches 
distort criminal activity temporally in the light of our original conceptual framework. 
 
II. Data 
 
A- Football Data  
We have collected information for all matches for the nine major London football 
teams from October 1994 to March 1997 with the help of the Association of Football 
Statistician. The teams are Arsenal, Charlton Athletics, Chelsea, Crystal Palace, 
Millwall, Queens Park Rangers, Tottenham Hotspurs, West Ham United, and 
Wimbledon. As can be seen in Figure 2, these teams have their home stadiums located 
in seven of the 31 boroughs of London. The teams located in the same boroughs 
always alternate home and away matches when playing at the same time which 
therefore does not pose problems for our modelling strategy7. We have a total of  
1,147 games played by our nine London  teams during this time period. We drop from 
the data days which fall out of the football season which runs from mid-August to 
mid-May.  
Figure 3 shows the levels of attendance for each of the nine London teams with 
the top panel for home games and the bottom panel for away matches.. The average 
attendance level across team for this period is roughly 20,000 spectators for both 
types of games. However the Figures show how this varies greatly between teams and 
also from one match to the next. This is a very important feature for our identification 
strategy which relies on changes in attendance levels across time.  
For each match we have detailed information on its type and outcome. We have 
the final score and goal difference for each match. We use the predicted outcome of 
each game by bookmakers (based on the Elo ratings system) to classify a game was an 
                                                 
7 The model exploits the difference in attendance levels to home and away matches when both happen 
simultaneously for teams located in the same borough.  
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upset loss or not8. For the matches which are competitions - i.e. not regular schedule 
games part of the national championship -,  we have up to ten rounds to reach a final. 
We gathered information on the number of yellow and red cards handed out by the 
referee during each game. We know the location of away matches and use it to 
estimate the distance fans have to travel.  
Table 1 reports the main summary statistics for these matches and shows an 
almost even distribution between home and away games in our sample. Although 
most games are played on Saturday afternoon the distribution is still relatively 
dispersed with for example 17 percent of matches on Wednesday evenings. The 
distribution is also quite evenly distributed across borrows where the major London 
football teams are located. Finally, a significant number of matches are derbies (7%), 
competitions (17%), and upset losses (5%) which will be useful for our identification 
of the various effects these games could have on crime.   
 
 
B – Crime Data  
The football data was matched at the borough level to hourly recorded crime from the 
Metropolitan Criminal Statistics System (MCSS). This database includes on all crimes 
recorded in London by the police including information on the borough where 
offences took place and the estimated time at which they were committed. We can 
differentiate between property (burglaries, theft and handling of stolen goods, and 
criminal damage) and violent (violence against the person, sexual offences, and 
robberies) crime categories. We generate from the timing of crime information four 
equal six hours periods which run from 6 A.M. one day to the same hour on the 
following day9. This is the most geographically detailed and high frequency crime 
data available in the UK to our knowledge. 
                                                 
8 I would like to thank Bill Hunter from Mables-Tables.com for providing me with the 
Elo ratings data for each game.  The basic idea behind this rating system is that as 
football matches are played over a season individual points totals are updated for each 
team depending upon match results. These points are used as the basis for match 
predictions and ‘upset losses’ will be defined as the home team losing (at a home or away) when the 
advantage in terms of Elo ratings was > 100.  
 
9 The six hours window was chosen because this is the time officers are assigned to a home match and 
would therefore account for the appropriate period to account for within borough police displacement 
(House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2009). A football game lasts more or less two hours 
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 Table 2 reports the mean number of crimes recorded for different categories in 
the seven boroughs where football teams are located. It shows the statistic by period 
of the day and whether there was no game, a home game, or an away game in the 
borough. We can see that most crimes recorded are property crimes and that the levels 
are much higher for this category during the afternoon rather than the evening hours. 
The large standard deviations suggest large variations in the number of recorded 
offences across periods and areas.  It is therefore not possible by looking at the Table 
to begin and stipulate if any type of crime is higher or lower during home or away 
matches. The over-dispersion of the number of crimes committed is a common feature 
of area level crime data at high frequency. From an econometric standpoint, it is 
important to use an estimation strategy that takes into account the nature of the data. 
 
C - Estimation Strategy 
While the simplest methodology is to estimate ordinary least-squares (OLS) models 
using the number of recorded crime, this strategy has several problems. Because 
criminal incidents are positively skewed, it is common to transform the data using log 
or log rates. However, because we are using six-hourly data for individual boroughs 
there are a non-trivial number of zeros – particularly when focusing on individual 
crime categories10 – in the data complicating the use of log rates. In order to address 
this concern we use a negative binomial regression model. It is a generalisation of the 
Poisson regression model that allows for the variance of the outcome measure to 
differ from the mean, making it appropriate for count data with over-dispersion. In 
order to accommodate the fixed effects we have introduced in our model, we used the 
fixed effects negative binomial developed by Hausman et al (1984). The coefficients 
we will estimate represent the effects of the independent variables on the log of the 
mean incidence and can therefore be interpreted as the percentage effect of the 
independent variables on crime.  
 There are only seven boroughs in our data which will be identifying game 
attendance ‘treatment’ as their local teams are playing home or away. This raises the 
question of the validity of using the other 24 London areas which do not have football 
                                                                                                                                            
and the six hours window would also capture the two hours before and after a match when a potential 
offender could be incapacitated with pre and post match activities.    
10 There were only 3.4 percent hour-window/borough cells when no property crimes were recorded but 
almost 37.5 percent with no violent crimes reported. Certain offence sub-categories have extremely few 
incidents reported and therefore a very large number of zeros (e.g. 88.9 percent for criminal damage 
and 92.7 percent for sexual offences). 
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teams for our analysis? There are two reasons why it seems appropriate to keep all the 
available boroughs in our analysis. The first is simply that although the areas with no 
teams will not contribute to the identification of our estimates of the game attendance 
coefficients, they do help us to estimate the other covariates with greater precision. 
The fixed effect nature of our models also should guarantee that we are estimating 
match impacts on crime within borough that will not be affected by using the areas 
with no local football teams.  
The second reason to use all the 31 boroughs of London for our analysis is our 
concern with possible spatial displacement issues. There is a possibility that areas 
without a local team may be affected by match attendance in other boroughs. Fan 
concentration, police displacement, and voluntary incapacitation may impact on the 
criminal activity of these areas although in a way which is difficult to conceptually 
describe. We assume that if there is such an indirect impact in place it should be 
stronger for boroughs closer rather than further away from treated areas. This is why 
we have included controls for measures distances to boroughs with home and away 
games in our models which should capture possible spatial displacement effects of the 
match-crime relationship. For these reasons we believe that using all the boroughs of 
London for our analysis to obtain the most precise estimates possible.  
 
III. Results 
The first results in column (1) of Table 3 present negative binomial regression 
estimates with fixed effects, holiday and weather controls in which the dependent 
variable is the total number of recorded crimes. We build up from this model and add 
dummies for number of other games, total attendance level at those games, distance 
measures for each borough to areas hosting a match and distance to away games 
played by a local team. The resulting impact on all crimes is reported in column (4) 
and we find positive and significant home game and home attendance effects. The 
coefficient on the home game dummy captures the raw impact of hosting a match on 
the crime rate in a borough. Our identification stems from the variations in attendance 
and we see in column (4) that an extra 10,000 fans at a home game lead to a 4 percent 
increase in crime. We find so far no impact of away attendance levels on criminal 
activity. The importance of considering different offence categories is highlighted in 
columns (5) and (6) which report results for property and violent crimes. We find that 
all the match effect on crime we observe comes from changes in the recorded property 
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offences. There is now a significant decrease in the numbers of property crimes 
committed when a local team is playing away suggesting some level of incapacitation 
as attendance to those games grows.  
We consider more detailed crime categories in the results reported in Table 4. 
The results show that all the home and away game effects on property offences stems 
from the number of thefts committed during matches. There is no sign of changes in 
burglaries and importantly, criminal damage, which could be argued to be an atypical 
property crime that may increase as a result of the concentration effect. Also we still 
find no evidence of changes in violent crimes apart from the home game ‘intercept’ is 
now marginally significant. The theft category is mostly composed of thefts from and 
of motor vehicles11, thefts from shops and of pedal cycles. We can reasonably argue 
that these types of crimes are the most attractive to opportunistic offenders for 
financial gains. We therefore interpret the strong coefficients associated with this 
category of offences during home and away attendance as a sign that a combination of 
displacement and voluntary incapacitation is at play in the match-crime relationship.  
Results from models which include a large number of information on matches 
outcome and type are reported in Table 5. We still observe our main finding of 
increases (decreases) of property crimes as attendance to home (away) games grows. 
However all the other game controls we include do not appear to change the levels of 
property offences committed during matches. This is also what we find for almost all 
the match outcome and type variables we add to the model for violent crime.  We are 
more surprised by this result since we assumed many of these match outcome controls 
could have psychological influence over fan violent behaviour. The only interesting 
result here is a marginally significant notable increase in violence when an area is 
hosting a derby game. This suggests that concentration could play a role in increasing 
the number of violent interactions but only when the level of rivalry between 
opposing fans is high.  
We now turn to considerations of possible temporal displacement of criminal 
activity in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. These tables report results from the same model as 
Table 5 for respectively property and violent crime for the six-hour periods before and 
                                                 
11 We may worry that the potential supply of motor vehicles that can be stolen increases during home 
matches with the number of fans driving to the stadium. However, almost all the stadiums in our 
sample have adjoined car park facilities for fans which are part of the area patrolled by the police 
during games (the stadium ‘footprint’). Also, all the teams are located in high density urban areas 
where the number of motor vehicles parked is certainly almost at maximum capacity which explains 
why most fans are advised and choose to travel to stadiums by public transport whenever possible.  
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after each game. Table 6.2 shows that in this time window there does not appear to be 
any game attendance impact on property crimes. This would confirm that this type of 
criminal activity is not temporally displaced during the day but increases and 
decreases in absolute terms during home and away games. The picture for violent 
crime is different and the results are reported in Table 6.2.  We find a marginally 
statistically significant increase in violent crime of 10 percent for every 10,000 extra 
fans after home matches in the host community. This is again a net increase over the 
day as we did not observe a matching decrease in crime over the other time periods. 
This is in line with the findings of Rees and Schnepel (2008) on the increase of 
violent offences experienced by the host community of sporting events. Our approach 
however suggests that it is important to distinguish between criminal behaviour 
effects during and after games. The voluntary incapacitation of potential offenders 
during matches ends after a game and appears to leave way for the violent encounters 
predicted by the concentration effect. 
Limiting possible temporal displacement to only the short time window around a 
match may not capture the real distorting impact of a match. Jacobs et al (2007) for 
example showed that extreme weather shocks inversely displace crime in the 
following week. We therefore consider the possibility of a match effect up to 12 
periods before and after games. The conceptual framework we designed to identify 
the match-crime relationship suggests that we compare the home and away game 
effects (Figure 1). We compute estimates of the difference in attendance coefficients 
(β1 – β2) from the model used in Table 5 for the 25 six-hour periods of interest. The 
estimated coefficients from this exercise are reported with +/- two standard errors in 
Figures 4.1 for property and 4.2 for violent crimes. The difference in game attendance 
effect during a match is at 0 on the axis with preceding and following time periods 
going from -12 to +12. We find that the estimated effect is only statistically 
significant for property offences at the time when a match is taking place. The lack of 
any other effect identified for the difference of the home and game attendance 
coefficients leads us to several conclusions. First there appears not to be any 
noticeable temporal displacement of property or violent offence as a result of football 
matches. Second the observed increase in violence just after home matches is not 
precisely estimated enough to be significant. Finally the main finding from this 
research remains the important estimated increases in local property crime resulting 
from hosting large sporting events.  
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Following our conceptual framework, we conclude that the principal explanation 
for this increase lies in the displacement of police forces during matches. The 
importance of voluntary incapacitation effect during matches is estimated from the 
negative coefficient of away attendance at -.003. By assuming a relatively similar 
level of incapacitation per home supporters, we are able to identify the net effect of 
police displacement. This is equivalent to the (β1 – β2) coefficient at period zero in 
Table 3.1 which is equal to -.007 with an associated standard error of .002. It means 
that property crime increases by 7 percent in a borough hosting a home game for 
every 10,000 extra fans attending and this is mainly of result of the displacement of 
law enforcement personnel policing the event. In absolute term this represents an 
extra 1.5 property crimes committed in a borough hosting a match during the six-hour 
period around the game. 
  
IV. Conclusion 
We show in this paper that the impact large sporting events may have on criminal 
activity is more complex than the simple effect they could have on the violent 
behaviour of fans. We develop a conceptual framework to understand the match-
crime relationship which considers all the direct and indirect effects sporting events 
may have on offending behaviour. We describe three possible channels which are the 
geographical concentration of rival fans, the displacement of police personnel, and the 
voluntary incapacitation of potential offenders. Making simple assumptions we are 
able to determine the likely impact of each of these effects on local area crime during 
home and away games on property and violent crime. We the attempt to identify them 
separately by exploiting the variation in attendance to games from nine London teams 
located in seven different boroughs of the city. 
Perhaps surprisingly, considering the amount of anecdotal evidence on the 
aggressive behaviour, we do not uncover any effect of football matches on area 
violent crime. There is however some evidence that the number of violent interactions 
is more frequent when the rivalry between opposite supporters is higher. The results 
also suggest that if the concentration effect is responsible for increases in violent 
crime, it is only in the hours after the game is over. This could be explained by the 
displacement and incapacitation effects only impacting on criminal behaviour during 
matches. However this evidence is relatively weak and we do not believe that football 
matches in London contribute to substantial changes in violent behaviour. 
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The main finding of this research is that home game attendance significantly 
increases property crime in the borough hosting the event. On the contrary when 
teams are playing away, an inverse relationship is observed with property crime 
dropping as away attendance increases. We find no evidence of inter-temporal 
substitution of property crime even after extending the sample period of analysis to up 
to three days before and after the event. We calculate that voluntary incapacitation is 
responsible of a drop of 3 percent of the incidence of property crimes in a team home 
borough for every extra 10,000 fans attending an away match. Using this estimate we 
are able to evaluate a net police displacement effect of 7 percentage point increase in 
property crimes in the host community.   
These findings show how crucial it is to distinguish between the different 
channels though which certain events may impact on criminal behaviour. In our case, 
how important is the effect on crime of the incapacitation of the potential thieves 
attending a match relative to the displacement of police to the stadium. These results 
will also fuel the ongoing public policy debate about who should ‘pay for police’ 
during football matches in the UK12. They do not however clearly answer this 
question since reduced property crime levels during away games could be seen as 
socially beneficial although one could argue that it is only displacing the cost to other 
communities. More importantly, the surprising result of no changes in violent 
behaviour during matches – except during derbies where the emotional state of fans is 
arguably the ‘hottest’ – suggests that the high levels of police deployed is successful 
in containing group violence behaviour. Indeed, recent research by Poutvaara and 
Priks (2009) has shown that removal of officers in charge of the monitoring of sports 
fan leads to sharp increases in hooligan violence. One could therefore conclude to 
some social benefits of the police being displaced to stadiums although this should of 
course not be at the cost to the rest of the community.  
 
                                                 
12 “Football ‘should pay for police’”, BBC News Online, 12th August 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7553875.stm  
 20
References 
Bloom, Nicholas (2007) “The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks,” Econometrica, 77, 623-
685. 
Card, David and Gordon Dahl (2009) “Family Violence and Football: The Effect of 
Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior” NBER Working Paper No. 
15497  
Dahl, Gordon and Stefano DellaVigna (2009) “Does Movie Violence Increase Violent 
Crime?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124, 677-734.    
Di Tella, Rafael and Ernesto Schargrodsky (2004) “Do Police Reduce Crime? 
Estimate Using the Allocation of Police Forces after a Terrorist Attack.” 
American Economic Review, 94, 115-133.  
Draca, Mirco, Stephen Machin, and Rober Witt (2008) “Panic on the Streets of 
London: Police, Crime and the July 2005 Terror Attack,” CEP Discussion 
Paper No. 852 
Dunning, Eric, Patrick Murphy, and John Williams (1988) The Roots of Football 
Hooliganism. A Historical and Sociological Study, London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 
Hansen, Kisrtine (2003) “Education and the Crime-Age Profile” The British Journal 
of Criminology, 43, 141-168 
Hausman, Jerry; Hall, Bronwyn H. and Griliches, Zvi. "Econometric Models for 
Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship," 
 Econometrica, 1984, 52, 909-938 
Hirschi, Travis and Michael Gottfredson (1983) “Age and the Explanation of Crime,” 
American Journal of Sociology, 89, 552-584. 
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2009) “The Cost of Policing Football 
Matches”, HC 676, London: The Stationary Office Ltd 
Jacob, Brian and Lars Lefgren (2003) “Are Idle Hands the Devil’s Workshop? 
Incapacitation, Concentration and Juvenile Crime,” American Economic 
Review, 93, 1560-1577. 
Jacob, Brian, Lars Lefgren, and Enrico Moretti (2007) “The Dynamics of Criminal 
Behaviour: Evidence from Weather Shocks,” Journal of Human Resources, 
42, 489-527. 
 21
Loewenstein, George (2000) “Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic 
Behaviour,” The American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 90, 
426-432  
Metropolitan Police Authority (2003) “Football Club Recharges” MPA Report 08 
http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-f/2003/030116/08/  
Poutvaara, Panu and Mikael Priks (2006) “The Effect of Police Intelligence on Group 
Violence: Evidence from Reassignments in Sweden,” Journal of Public 
Economics, 93, 403-411 
Rees, Daniel I. and Kevin T. Schnepel (2009) “College Football Games and Crime,” 
Journal of Sports Psychology, 10, 68-97 
Williams, J. (Various Years) “FA Premier League Fan Survey: a national survey of 
FA Premier League club fans, General Sample Report,” Sir Norman Chester 
Centre for Football Research   
Young, Kevin (2002) “Sport and Violence” in Jay Coakley and Eric Dunning, Eds. 
Handbook of Sports Studies, London, Sage Publications      
 22
Figure 1: Potential Direction of Displacement, Incapacitation, and Concentration 
Effects on Property and Violent Crimes of Home and Away Games 
 
 Property Violent 
Home Away Home Away 
 Displacement ↑ → ↑ → 
 Incapacitation ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
 Concentration → → ↑ → 
Note: Upward and downward pointing arrows represent respectively positive and negative impact from 
each of the three channels - concentration, incapacitation, displacement- through which home or away 
sporting events may impact one local property or violent crime. The flat arrows suggest that we do not 
expect any effect during home or away games for the corresponding crime category.      
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Figure 2: Map of London Boroughs 
with Football Grounds and Associated Football Teams 
 
 
 Borough Team(s) 
1 Croydon Crystal Palace & Wimbledon 
2 Greenwich Charlton Athletics 
3 Hammersmith & Fulham QPR & Chelsea United 
4 Haringey Tottenham Hotspur 
5 Islington Arsenal 
6 Lewisham Millwall 
7 Newham West Ham United 
1
2
7
6
4
3
5
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Figure 3: Home and Away Attendance Levels Per Football Team
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Figures 4.1: Property Crime – Difference in Home and Away  
Attendance Impact Coefficients 12 Periods Before and After Game 
 
 
Figures 4.2: Violent Crime – Difference in Home and Away  
Attendance Impact Coefficients 12 Periods Before and After Game 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Football Matches  
 
 Number of 
Games 
Fraction 
of Games 
All Games 1147 1 
   
Home Games 571 .502 
Away Games 576 .499 
   
London Derbies 81 .071 
Competitions 98 .172 
Upset Losses 53 .046 
   
Saturdays (12-18h) 616 .537 
Sunday (12-18h) 107 .093 
Other Days (12-18h) 60 .052 
Wednesday (18-00h) 193 .168 
Tuesday (18-00h) 114 .099 
Other Days (18-00h) 57 .050 
   
Croydon  263 .229 
Greenwich 131 .114 
Hammersmith 247 .215 
Haringey 121 .106 
Islington 134 117 
Lewisham 134 .117 
Newham 117 .102 
 
Note: Summary statistics for the 1147 games played by the 9 London teams 
between October 1994 and March 1997. Upset losses are defined as the 
home team losing at a home or away game although the advantage in terms 
of Elo ratings was > 100.  
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Table 2 - Mean Number of Crimes per Hour Window  
 
 Mean Number of Crimes 
(Standard Deviations) 
 
12 to 18 Hours  18 to 00 Hours 
No 
Game 
Home 
Game 
Away 
Game  
No 
Game 
Home 
Game 
Away 
Game 
All Crimes 
29.48 
(11.81) 
30.99 
(13.85) 
29.13 
(13.24)  
20.37 
(8.76) 
21.83 
(8.93) 
20.13 
(9.68) 
Property Crimes 
 20.94 
(8.85) 
23.70 
(11.04) 
21.60 
(10.61)  
12.06 
(5.55) 
14.36 
(5.76) 
12.45 
(5.63) 
Burglaries 
6.48 
(4.07) 
6.65 
(4.41) 
6.52 
(4.08)  
4.16 
(3.06) 
3.85 
(2.59) 
3.82 
(2.89) 
Thefts 
14.25 
(6.69) 
16.79 
(8.61) 
14.89 
(8.33)  
7.65 
(3.98) 
10.27 
(4.58) 
8.41 
(3.93) 
Criminal Damage 
0.20 
(0.57) 
0.26 
(0.74) 
0.18 
(0.48)  
0.24 
(0.61) 
0.25 
(0.51) 
0.23 
(0.54) 
Violent Crimes 
7.40 
(5.56) 
6.28 
(5.22) 
6.63 
(5.64)  
7.15 
(5.37) 
6.35 
(5.10) 
6.86 
(5.90) 
Violence 
3.86 
(3.97) 
3.72 
(3.77) 
3.82 
(4.17)  
4.26 
(4.32) 
3.90 
(4.00) 
4.18 
(4.21) 
Sexual offences 
0.34 
(1.09) 
0.24 
(0.84) 
0.22 
(0.81)  
0.30 
(0.97) 
0.19 
(0.74) 
0.27 
(0.97) 
Robberies 
3.20 
(1.17) 
2.32 
(3.04) 
2.59 
(3.34)  
2.59 
(2.96) 
2.26 
(3.13) 
2.41 
(3.27) 
Sample 5,007 391 392  5,315 180 184 
 
Note: The reported means are generated from the 7 boroughs which are home to one of the 9 teams 
since there are no equivalent for the home and away columns for the other boroughs.  
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Table 3: Impact of Home and Away Games and Attendance Levels  
on Total Number, Property, and Violent Crimes Reported to the Police 
 
  
 
Dependent Variables  = 
Number of Crimes Reported 
 All Crimes Property Violent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Home Game Dummy .009 
(.033) 
.054* 
(.033) 
.086** 
(.040) 
.084** 
(.040) 
.136*** 
(.041) 
.104 
(.095) 
Home Game Attendance 
(in Thousands) 
.003* 
(.002) 
.003* 
(.002) 
.004** 
(.002) 
.004** 
(.002) 
.004** 
(.002) 
.002 
(.004) 
Away Game Dummy -.023 (.031) 
.019 
(.032) 
-.008 
(.038) 
-.020 
(.042) 
-.011 
(.040) 
.055 
(.092) 
Away Game Attendance 
(in Thousands) 
-.000 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.004** 
(.002) 
.002 
(.004) 
       
Dummy Number of Other  
Home and Away Games No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Attendance to Other Home 
and Away Games No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance from Borough  of 
Home and to Away Games  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Holiday Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rain and Temperature Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borough * Hour * Day of 
the Week * Month * Season 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 43,896 43,896 43,896 43,896 43,896 43,896 
 
Notes: An observation is a six hour period 12 to 18 H or 18  to 00 H for the 31 London boroughs during the 
football season (mid –August to mid-May) between September 1994 and October 1997. The estimates come 
from negative binomial regressions, standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** respectively denote 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.     
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Table 4: Impact of Home and Away Games  
and Attendance Levels on Various Types of Crimes Reported to the Police 
 
  
 
Dependent Variables  = 
Number of Crimes Reported for the Following Categories 
 Property Crime Violent 
 Theft Burglary Criminal Damage Violence Sexual Robbery 
Home Game Dummy .192*** 
(.046) 
.026 
(.073) 
.124 
(.263) 
.203* 
(.121) 
-.517 
(.428) 
.183 
(.145) 
Home Game Attendance 
(in Thousands) 
.006*** 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.003) 
.002 
(.011) 
.001 
(.005) 
.006 
(.017) 
-.008 
(.006) 
Away Game Dummy .040 (.050) 
-.102 
(.074) 
.168 
(.290) 
.133 
(.119) 
-.263 
(.418) 
.005 
(.139) 
Away Game Attendance 
(in Thousands) 
-.006*** 
(.002) 
.002 
(.003) 
-.015 
(.012) 
.005 
(.005) 
-.020 
(.015) 
.003 
(.005) 
       
Dummy Number of Other  
Home and Away Games Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Attendance to Other Home 
and Away Games Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance from Borough  of 
Home and to Away Games  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Holiday Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rain and Temperature Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borough * Hour * Day of 
the Week * Month * 
Season Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 43,896 43,896 43,896 43,896 43,896 43,896 
 
Notes: An observation is a six hour period 12 to 18 H or 18 to 00 H for the 31 London boroughs during the 
football season (mid –August to mid-May) between September 1994 and October 1997. The estimates come 
from negative binomial regressions, standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** respectively denote 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.     
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Table 5: Impact on Property and Violent Crime of Home and Away  
Games and Attendance Levels Controlling for Match Characteristics 
 
  
 
Dependent Variables  = 
Number of Crimes Reported  
 Property Crime Violent 
 Home Away Home Away 
Game Dummy .139*** 
(.042) 
.014 
(.047) 
.126 
(.097) 
.013 
(.097) 
Game Attendance .004** (.002) 
-.003* 
(.002) 
.001 
(.005) 
.002 
(.004) 
Lose Game Upset -.019 (.079) 
-.087 
(.091) 
.127 
(.211) 
-.050 
(.231) 
Goal Difference .015 (.019) 
-.000 
(.021) 
-.052 
(.051) 
-.023 
(.052) 
Number of Cards -.002 (.008) 
-.008 
(.012) 
.005 
(.018) 
-.026 
(.031) 
London Derby -.005 (.042) 
-.069 
(.052) 
.184* 
(.100) 
.168 
(.114) 
Competition Round -.001 (.012) 
-.016 
(.012) 
-.035 
(.030) 
-.015 
(.025) 
     
Dummy Number of Other  
Home and Away Games Yes Yes 
Attendance to Other Home 
and Away Games Yes Yes 
Distance from Borough  of 
Home and to Away Games  Yes Yes 
Holiday Indicator Yes Yes 
Rain and Temperature Yes Yes 
Borough * Hour * Day of 
the Week * Month *  
Season Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes 
Observations 43,896 43,896 
 
Notes: An observation is a six hour period between 12 to 18 H or 18 to 00 H for the 31 
London boroughs during the football season (mid –August to mid-May) between September 
1994 and October 1997. The estimates come from negative binomial regressions, standard 
errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent level.     
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Table 6.1: Time Displacement of Property Crime – Impact of Home and Away  
Games and Attendance Levels Controlling for Match Characteristics 
 
  
 
Dependent Variables  = 
Number of Property Crimes Reported 
 Before After 
 Home Away Home Away 
Game Dummy -.021 
(.081) 
.011 
(.086) 
-.007 
(.081) 
.006 
(.084) 
Game Attendance .002 (.004) 
-.003 
(.003) 
.003 
(.004) 
-.001 
(.003) 
Lose Game Upset .074 (.180) 
-.054 
(.183) 
.077 
(.187) 
.081 
(.172) 
Goal Difference -.031 (.040) 
.019 
(.043) 
.054 
(.042) 
-.012 
(.045) 
Number of Cards .009 (.015) 
-.009 
(.023) 
.018 
(.014) 
-.028 
(.021) 
London Derby -.061 (.088) 
.038 
(.095) 
-.040 
(.086) 
.033 
(.097) 
Competition Round .012 (.003) 
-.015 
(.021) 
.033 
(.022) 
-.004 
(.021) 
     
Dummy Number of Other  
Home and Away Games Yes Yes 
Attendance to Other Home 
and Away Games Yes Yes 
Distance from Borough  of 
Home and to Away Games  Yes Yes 
Holiday Indicator Yes Yes 
Rain and Temperature Yes Yes 
Borough * Hour * Day of 
the Week * Month * Season 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes 
Observations 43,880 43,880 
 
Notes: An observation is a six hour period before and after 12 to 18 H or 18 to 00 H 
depending on the time the game started for the 31 London boroughs during the football season 
(mid –August to mid-May) between September 1994 and October 1997. The estimates come 
from negative binomial regressions, standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** respectively 
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.     
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Table 6.2: Time Displacement of Violent Crime – Impact of Home and Away  
Games and Attendance Levels Controlling for Match Characteristics 
 
  
 
Dependent Variables  = 
Number of Violent Crimes Reported 
 Before After 
 Home Away Home Away 
Game Dummy .108 
(.123) 
-.065 
(.126) 
-.008 
(.121) 
.107 
(.131) 
Game Attendance .009 (.006) 
.004 
(.005) 
.010* 
(.006) 
-.002 
(.005) 
Lose Game Upset -.334 (.296) 
-.365 
(.329) 
.030 
(.267) 
-.291 
(.278) 
Goal Difference -.073 (.070) 
-.014 
(.069) 
.072 
(.056) 
-.046 
(.066) 
Number of Cards -.034 (.024) 
-.023 
(.040) 
-.026 
(.023) 
-.018 
(.034) 
London Derby -.199 (.143) 
.017 
(.145) 
-.158 
(.132) 
.029 
(.141) 
Competition Round -.021 (.034) 
-.015 
(.031) 
-.021 
(.034) 
-.012 
(.032) 
     
Dummy Number of Other  
Home and Away Yes Yes 
Attendance to Other Home 
and Away Yes Yes 
Distance from Home Game 
Borough Yes Yes 
Holiday Indicator Yes Yes 
Rain and Temperature Yes Yes 
Borough * Hour * Day of 
the Week * Month * Year 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes 
Observations 43,880 43,880 
 
Notes: An observation is a six hour period before and after 12 P.M. to 6 P.M. or 6 P.M. to 12 
A.M depending on the time the game started for the 31 London boroughs during the football 
season (mid –August to mid-May) between September 1994 and October 1997. The estimates 
come from negative binomial regressions, standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** 
respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.     
 
  
  
 
